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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

23 April 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans (OIR)  
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SUBJECT: NIE 11-8-55: The Implications of an Austrian  
Treaty for the Policies of the  
USSR and Certain Other States

1. Attached are terms of reference for the prospective Austrian Treaty estimate requested by the Department of State and discussed briefly at the luncheon of the IAC Senior Representatives on 20 April.

2. The IAC target date for the estimate is 17 May. It is therefore very desirable if not necessary to shortcut our usual procedure.

3. We suggest that we not meet on these terms of reference, but that those agencies that can do so prepare brief contributions based thereon. If you consider that additional points should be raised, please include these in your contribution, or pass them by telephone to Mr. Matthew Gallagher (Code 143, Extension 3426).

4. All contributions should be in ONE by Monday 2 May.

*Paul A. Borel*

PAUL A. BOREL  
Deputy Assistant Director  
National Estimates

Distribution "B"

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

23 April 1955

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE 11-8-55: THE IMPLICATIONS OF  
AN AUSTRIAN TREATY FOR THE POLICIES OF THE USSR AND  
CERTAIN OTHER STATES

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the implications of an Austrian treaty settlement  
for the policies of the USSR and certain other states.

ASSUMPTION

That the USSR will sign an Austrian Treaty on the basis of the  
existing draft, together with modifications agreed with Austria in  
the Moscow Communique of 15 April without:

- a. Insisting upon "neutralization" in the form of an agree-  
ment of the Four Powers authorizing unilateral intervention  
against violations of Austrian neutrality, or

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- b. Demanding guarantees against Anschluss in such a form as, in effect, to prevent implementation of the Paris Agreements.

#### QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

#### I. THE ROLE OF AUSTRIA IN SOVIET POST-WAR POLICY

- A. What has been the role of Austria in Soviet post-war policy? (Contributions should include a brief historical summary of the trends in Soviet policy toward Austria since the war, and an analysis of the objectives which Soviet policy has pursued in connection with the Austrian problem.)
- B. What political, economic, and military advantages has the USSR derived in Austria from its occupation of eastern Austria and from the Four Power control of Austria as a whole? What advantages elsewhere in Europe?

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## II. FACTORS MOTIVATING THE SOVIET DECISION TO SIGN THE AUSTRIAN TREATY

- A. To what extent do the new Soviet terms for conclusion of an Austrian treaty represent concessions from earlier positions?
- B. What factors, internal to the Soviet Bloc as well as on the international level, have caused the USSR to change its policy toward Austria?
- C. In the light of these factors, what is the present Soviet estimate of the relative advantages and disadvantages of an Austrian state treaty? (Contributions should include the probable Soviet assessment of the costs and compensations of an Austrian treaty in political, economic, and military terms.)

## III. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE SOVIET POLICY

- A. What are the implications for the future course of Soviet policy with respect to:
  - 1. Desire to reduce international tensions?
  - 2. Objectives in Germany?

3. Control of the Satellites?
4. Relations with Yugoslavia?
5. Such other issues as Formosa, Indo-China, and Korea;  
disarmament and nuclear weapon control?

IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE POLICIES OF OTHER STATES

- A. What will be the effect of an Austrian settlement upon  
the non-Communist world's assessment of Soviet intentions?  
Upon the policies of the NATO countries? Upon the  
policies of the rest of the non-Communist world?
- B. In particular, what will be the effect upon West German  
attitudes toward rearmament and unification? Upon the  
policies of the West German government?